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Dynamic repeated random dictatorship and gender discrimination

  • Dennis A.V. Dittrich
  • Susanne Büchner
  • Micaela M Kulesz

Abstract

To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour.

Cite this activity

Dittrich D.A.V., Büchner S. and Kulesz M.M. (2015) Dynamic repeated random dictatorship and gender discrimination. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 55: 81-90. 10.1016/j.socec.2015.02.001

Details

Date 01.04.2015
Journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Volume 55
Pages 81-90
Open Access Closed Access
Open Access Status Closed Access
Eprints_link https://cris.leibniz-zmt.de/id/eprint/2402
Peer-Reviewed

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