Dynamic repeated random dictatorship and gender discrimination
Dennis A.V. Dittrich
Susanne Büchner
Micaela M Kulesz
Abstract
To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour.
Dittrich D.A.V., Büchner S. and Kulesz M.M. (2015) Dynamic repeated random dictatorship and gender discrimination. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 55: 81-90. 10.1016/j.socec.2015.02.001
@article{Dittrich2015,
Title = {Dynamic repeated random dictatorship and gender discrimination},
Author = {Dittrich, Dennis A.V. and Büchner, Susanne and Kulesz, Micaela M},
Editor = {},
Journal = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics},
Year = {2015},
Pages = {81-90},
Volume = {55},
Doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2015.02.001},
Abstract = {To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour.},
}
TY - JOUR
AU - Dittrich, Dennis A.V.
AU - Büchner, Susanne
AU - Kulesz, Micaela M
TI - Dynamic repeated random dictatorship and gender discrimination
T2 - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
PY - 2015
SP - 81-90
VL - 55
DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2015.02.001
AB - To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour.
ER -
Details
Date01.04.2015
JournalJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics